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Covering the Spread: An Assessment
of Amateurism and Vulnerability of
Student-Athletes in an Emerging
Culture of Sports Wagering
ABSTRACT
Sports gambling is an extremely lucrative, but scrutinized,
industry. Athletic organizations contend that any form of sports
wagering adversely affects players, teams, and spectators. They argue
that intermingling gambling with sports turns spectators into skeptics
and taints honest and fair competition. Congress enacted legislation
limiting the scope of permissible sports wagering, but this legislation is
under attack by many states advocating its repeal. The expansion of
legalized sports wagering poses a threat, particularly on collegiate
athletics. By definition, college athletes are amateurs. The definition of
amateurism forms the foundation for the regulations governing
intercollegiate competition. But, this status coupled with the
transformation of collegiate athletics into a billion-dollar industry
intensifies college athletes' vulnerabilities to external threats associated
with sports wagering. This Note argues that applying a definition of
amateurism strictly premised on the prohibition of compensation harms
rather than protects the core values of the student-athlete. In light of the
evolution of sports wagering, the Note calls for an internal audit of the
governing institution, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA). Utilizing its authority to promulgate binding regulations on
its member institutions, the NCAA should redefine amateurism to
protect itself and the ideal of the student-athlete from the threats of
sports wagering.
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Sports gambling is a multibillion-dollar industry.1  The
American Gaming Association estimates that legal sports gambling
yields $3 billion in wagers,2 while illegal sports gambling generates
nearly $500 billion annually.3 This impressive disparity illustrates a
1. See NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 2-14 (1999) [hereinafter
NGISC FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.ncfpc.org/specialngisc.html; see also AM. GAMING
ASS'N, STATE OF THE STATES: THE AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT 33 (2012) [hereinafter
STATE OF THE STATES], available at http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/
docs/soslaga sos_2012_web.pdf (noting Nevada's casinos alone accounted for more than $2.8
billion worth of wagers on sporting events in 2011).
2. See STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 1 (noting that football wagers accounted for $1.3
billion, basketball wagers accounted for $737 million, and baseball wagers accounted for $557
million).
3. See Chad Millman, Authorities Expose $50M Betting Ring, ESPN (Oct. 25, 2012, 5:52
PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/storyL/id/8550476/new-york-issues-25-indictments-50-million-
betting-ring (stating that some estimate that illegal wagers generate $500 billion annually).
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shortage of outlets through which individuals can legally place wagers
on sporting events. 4  Currently, only Nevada and Delaware allow
sports-wagering schemes. 5 But many states, like New Jersey, recognize
the potential for economic stimulation and want to create
sports-wagering schemes to capitalize on this lucrative market.
6
Despite their willingness to offer more legal sports-wagering outlets,
the current federal regime prevents any state from entering into this
profitable industry.'
Changing the status quo may allow states to directly profit from
new sources of revenue, but there is strong opposition to reform efforts.
8
The media's glamorization of gambling distorts gambling's often-harsh
realities.9 While there are big winners, there are also big losers, many
of whom are innocent bystanders. 10 Sport fans occupy a class of
innocent bystanders harmed by gambling's threat to the "integrity of
the game," particularly the notion of fair play. 1 Potential corruption or
even the appearance of corruption in sports tarnishes their reputations
4. But see infra notes 152-55 and accompanying test (suggesting that the disparity also
illustrates lack of public awareness of the illegality and risks of sports wagering). People gamble
for many reasons, see, e.g., R. Randall Bridwell & Dr. Frank L. Quinn, Joy to Misfortune: The
Merger of Law and Politics in the World of Gambling, 72 MiSS. L.J. 565, 693-94 (2002), so
increasing legalized sports wagering outlets may not likely displace an equivalent amount of illegal
outlets.
5. See STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 1.
6. See Chris Sieroty, California Looking to Legalize Sports Bets, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-
JOURNAL (July 29, 2013, 2:03 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/sportslbetting/california-
looking-legalize-sports-bets; STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 23-27 (discussing
communities' perspectives on the economic benefits related to gambling). But see NGISC FINAL
REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-14 ("Unlike casinos or other destination resorts, sports wagering does
not create other economic sectors.").
7. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04 (2012) (defining the narrow scope of legalized
sports wagering).
8. See discussion infra Part I.C.3. This Note treats "gambling," "wagering," and "betting"
as synonymous terms in the context of sporting contests and events.
9. See R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy to Misfortune: The Merger
of Law and Politics in the World of Gambling, 72 MISS. L.J. 565, 688, 729 (2002) (associating
gambling with inevitable damage and corruption). Many studies link gambling to organized crime,
drug abuse, gambling addictions, and bankruptcy. See John Warren Kindt, The Failure to Regulate
the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives for Perpetual Non-Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 221,
223, 226-27, 240-41 (2003). For a discussion on the costs and benefits of gambling policy, see Guy
Calvert, Gambling America: Balancing the Risks of Gambling and Its Regulation, 349 CATO
POLICY ANALYSIS 1 (1999).
10. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
11. See John Warren Kindt & Thomas Asmar, College and Amateur Sports Gambling:
Gambling Away Our Youth?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221, 221 (2002) ("[S]ports betting
threatens the integrity of and public confidence in professional and amateur team sports,
converting sports from wholesome athletic entertainment into a vehicle for gambling [which]
raises people's suspicions about point-shaving and game-fixing." (citing NGISC FINAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 3-8, 3-9 (1999) (statement of Sen. Bill Bradley))).
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and weakens fans' respect for the programs, leagues, and players.1 2 As
athletic organizations defend the integrity of their respective games,
they must assess the particularized risks of sports gambling.
College athletics is a multibillion-dollar industry. 13 Yet, college
athletes only receive a limited share of the profits, and only in the form
of athletic-based scholarships.' 4  In fact, the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA), in its capacity as the governing institution
of intercollegiate athletics, explicitly forbids any form of player
compensation. 15  Accepting any form of performance-related
compensation-including promises of future payment--costs the
college athlete her amateur status, rendering her ineligible for
intercollegiate competition. 16 This constraint on pay exposes college
athletes' inherent vulnerability to threats posed by sports wagering. 17
Thus, as the NCAA seeks to maintain the integrity of intercollegiate
competition, it must tackle sports wagering's particularized threat to
the preservation of amateurism.' 8
In light of New Jersey's recent attempt to expand legalized
sports wagering in the United States, this Note argues that the NCAA
should focus on an internal reform honoring the ideal of amateurism
while addressing the vulnerability of student-athletes. Part I discusses
the history of legal and illegal sports wagering, the tension
surrounding sports-wagering regulations, and the NCAA's
anti-gambling stance. Part II analyzes the potential effects of the
legalization of sports wagering on the NCAA's authority, the degree to
which sports wagering poses a legitimate threat to the integrity of
college athletics, and the implications of the NCAA's definition of
amateurism on the vulnerability of student-athletes. Part III proposes
a solution that allows the NCAA to reduce student-athletes'
12. See id.
13. See Christina L.L. Martin et al., An Analysis of Collegiate Marketing Strategies and
Evaluation Process, 4 J. ISSUES INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 42, 44 (2011) (stating that college
athletics grew from $282 million in 1999 to $7 billion in 2009); The Business of College Football,
FORBES, http://www.forbes.comlspecial-report/2012/business-of-college-football-rank.html (last
visited Aug. 25, 2013) (estimating that the top 20 college football programs collectively generated
$1.296 billion in revenue for 2012).
14. Compare College Athletics Revenues, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/ncaa/revenue
(last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (detailing the revenues of college athletic departments), with College
Athletics Expenses, ESPN.cOM, http://espn.go.comlncaalrevenue/ /type/expenses (last visited Oct.
30, 2013) (breaking down college athletic departments' expenses and distributions of revenues).
15. See NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2012-13 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.1.2
(2012) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL], available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/geot/genrel/
auto pdf/2012-13/misc non event/12-13-ncaa-manual.pdf (defining the rule on amateurism).
16. See id.
17. See infra Parts I.D.2, II.C.1.
18. See infra Part I.D.2.
[Vol. 16:1:133
COVERING THE SPREAD
vulnerabilities associated with sports wagering without forfeiting the
ideal of amateurism.
I. SPORTS GAMBLING'S ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
Sports wagering, and other forms of gambling in the United
States, exist in both legal and illegal markets. 19 The fact that
Americans illegally wager billions of dollars annually validates
descriptions of illegal gambling as "a thriving illegal business hiding in
plain sight."20  The potential for substantial payouts without the
burdens of regulation or taxation attracts individuals to illegal
markets.21 Moreover, the Internet has played an important role in
making illegal gambling more accessible and convenient to the public
at large.
22
A. History of Government Oversight of the Gambling Industry
Prior to the 1960s, the federal government deferred to states in
gambling-related matters. 23 But in response to public outcry, the
federal government expanded its role and began taking measures in
1961 aimed at reducing the role and presence of organized crime in the
gambling industry. 24 Congress's first significant restriction on the
gambling industry, the Wire Act,25 criminalizes the transmission of
wagers, information to place wagers, and money or credit resulting from
the placement of wagers through wire communications. 26 The second
19. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-1 (estimating that forty-eight states
permit a form of legalized gambling).
20. See id.
21. See S. REP. No. 102-248, at 7 (1991).
22. See Richard Finger, Online Gambling: A Pastime Whose Time Has Come, FORBES
(June 30, 2013, 9:27 AM), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2013/06/30/
online-gambling-a-pastime-whose-time-has-come. The topic of online gambling falls beyond the
scope of this Note.
23. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-10. The federal government still allows
state-authorized lotteries. See id. at 3-4. In 1999, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia
exercised this authority. See id. at 2-3. In 2013, forty-three states, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands operate state lotteries. See Lottery Results, USA.GOV,
http://www.usa.gov/Topics/Lottery-Results.shtml (last updated Sept. 4, 2013).
24. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-3.
25. Pub. L. No. 87-216, § 2, 75 Stat. 491 (1961) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1084
(2012)).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). But Congress allows wire transmissions of information for
purposes of news reporting sporting events as well as information for purposes of placing wagers
on sporting events, provided that wagering on the sporting event is legal in both states in which
the transmission occurs. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b).
2013]
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significant restriction, the Travel Act,27 criminalizes the use of
interstate and foreign commerce to further "any unlawful activity,"
which explicitly includes any activity related to illegal gambling. 28
Although Congress designed the Wire Act and the Travel Act to
apply to persons engaged or intending to engage in illegal sports
wagering, neither act diminished the states' authority to legalize such
wagering activities. 29 The federal government deferred to states for
thirty more years, allowing each to decide whether to legalize wagering
on sporting events.3
0
B. Questions of Integrity and Corruption in College Sports
Anyone reading the sports section of the newspaper, logging on
to a sports news page on the Internet, listening to a sports radio station,
or watching ESPN knows that the world of sports is not immune to
scandal. 31  But gambling-related scandal, particularly involving
collegiate sports, is also not a recent phenomenon. 32 For instance, as
early as the 1950s, the public witnessed point-shaving scandals
involving Men's Division I basketball players attempting to influence
the final scores of games. 33 In 1951, a New York district attorney
27. Pub. L. No. 87-228, § 1(a), 75 Stat. 498 (1961) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1952 (2012)).
28. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)-(b) (2012). The broad applicability of the Travel Act
enables federal criminal prosecution of organized crime and misconduct of state and federal elected
officials as it pertains to gambling. See Barry Breen, The Travel Act (18 U.S.C. § 1952): Prosecution
of Interstate Acts in Aid of Racketeering, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 125, 125 (1986). Congress further
restricted the gambling industry by barring interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia,
but it exempted states with legalized sports wagering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1953(b) (2012).
29. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952 (2012) (indicating Congress only intended to restrict
certain gambling activities).
30. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-9.
31. See, e.g., Ante Z. Udovicic, Special Report: Sports and Gambling a Good Mix? I
Wouldn't Bet on It, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 401, 403 (1998) (describing the 1919 Black Sox Scandal
where eight White Sox players received lifetime bans for fixing the Baseball World Series); Steve
Wyche, NFL Shows Evidence of Saints' "Bounty' Program to Media, NFL.COM (Aug. 3, 2012, 1:37
AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09OOOd5d829f19d3/article/nfl-shows-evidence-of-saints-
bounty-program-to-media (discussing a scandal involving financial bonuses paid to professional
football players for injuring opponents); Most Significant College Sports Scandals, USA TODAY
SPORTS, http://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/sports/ncaaf/2013/09/13/most-significant
college-sports-scandals/2792053 (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (describing scandals involving college
athletes and coaches spanning from 1950 to 2013); Sports Scandals, ECONOMIST,
http://www.economist.com/topics/sports-scandals (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (detailing recent sport
scandals involving doping and cheating at the college, professional, and international level).
32. See Most Significant College Sports Scandals, supra note 31; infra text accompanying
notes 33-37; see also Kindt & Asmar, supra note 11, at 236-38 (discussing the point shaving
scandals that occurred during the 1990s).
33. See Joe Goldstein, Explosion: 1951 Scandals Threaten College Hoops, ESPN CLASSIC
(Nov. 19, 2003), http://espn.go.com/classic/s/basketball-scandals-explosion.html. Point-shaving is
"an attempt (as by a member of the team favored to win) to influence the final score of a game so
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arrested two players on the Manhattan College men's basketball team
for manipulating the point margin in several games in exchange for
money.34 Over the next few months, the district attorney uncovered
point-shaving scandals involving thirty-two players from seven
colleges, who had "fixed" eighty-six games. 35 These convictions, and
their dissonance with the celebrated ideal of the amateur
student-athlete, shocked the public.36 In light of these scandals, the
public began to scrutinize athletic institutions and schools for
inadequately supervising their student-athletes.3
7
Despite the point-shaving scandals' negative impact on the
public's perception of sports wagering, the industry generally avoided
regulation through the 1980s.38 In 1992, however, Congress recognized
a "distinct [flederal interest in protecting sports from corruption" and
enacted restrictive gambling-related legislation.3 9  This legislation
altered the status quo, discontinuing the federal government's
that the predicted winner wins by less than the point spread." Point-shaving, MERRIAM WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/point%20shaving (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). To
understand the betting aspect of point-shaving and fixing games:
[A] ssume that the game [a better] fixed was between Team A and Team B. Team A was
favored to win by 10 points. That meant bookies would accept your bet if you thought
Team A would win by more than 10 points. [The better] had told his bribed player--on
Team B-that his team must lose by at least 15 points. Therefore, [the better] bet,
confidently, on Team A, giving 10 points.
Jeremiah Tax, The Facts About the Fixes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 27, 1961, at 18.
34. See Goldstein, supra note 33 (noting that some players received thousands of dollars
to shave points).
35. See id. (listing the players and their punishments). Fixing techniques ranged from
shaving points off the spread to throwing games entirely. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. This scrutiny continued through the eighties as college basketball experienced
more point-shaving scandals. See Tax, supra note 33, at 19; see, e.g., Aaron J. Slavin, Comment,
The "Las Vegas Loophole" and the Current Push in Congress Towards a Blanket Prohibition on
Collegiate Sports Gambling, 10 U. MIAMI. BUS. L. REV. 715, 727-32 (2002) (discussing three
scandals that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s); Jeff Merron, Biggest Sports Gambling Scandals,
ESPN PAGE 2, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=merroni060207 (last updated Feb.
7, 2006) (discussing the alleged Boston College mob connection during the 1978-79 basketball
season and the accusation that five Tulane basketball players engaged in point-shaving schemes
in 1985).
38. But see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2012). In 1971, Congress enacted the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to combat the operation of sophisticated
criminal business enterprises, which includes the operation of sports betting rings. See id.; Press
Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Members of Alleged Sports Betting Ring Charged with
Racketeering, E. Dist. of Pa. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphialpress-
releases/2012/members-of-alleged-sports-betting-ring-charged-with-racketeering.
39. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 6 (1991). The representatives noted that "[t]he House
Judiciary Committee called such corruption 'a challenge to an important aspect of American
life-honestly competitive sports."' Id. Furthermore, the legislators recognized sports as national
institutions and made the act of bribery or the attempt to influence or bribe in any sporting event
or contest a federal crime under Title 18 because of the distinct federal interest. See id.
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deference to states in favor of a federal regime regulating the
legalization of sports wagering.
40
C. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992
In response to public concern about gambling's effects on the
legitimacy of amateur and professional sporting events and pressure
from professional and amateur sports organizations, Congress enacted
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA).41
Legislators intended PASPA to "serve[] an important public purpose, to
stop the spread of State-sponsored sports gambling and to maintain the
integrity of [the] national pastime."42 Since its enactment over twenty
years ago, PASPA has operated as a de facto federal ban on sports
wagering.43 The Act declares it unlawful for a government entity or a
person to:
[S]ponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a
governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering
scheme based, directly or indirectly . . . on one or more competitive games in which
amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or
more performances of such athletes in such games.
4 4
But Congress included a significant caveat: the ban exempted
states with legalized sports-wagering schemes in operation at the time
of PASPA's enactment. 45  Of the fifty states, only four-Delaware,
40. See infra Part I.C. (discussing the history, scope, and enforcement of the federal law
prohibiting sports wagering).
41. See Pub. L. No. 102-559, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 4228 (1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 3701-3704 (2012)); S. REP. No. 102-248, at 3, 5, 8 (1991) (citing legislative history that
representatives of the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association
(NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL), and Major League Baseball (MLB), testified in favor
of PASPA). The representatives testified that:
Sports gambling threatens to change the nature of sporting events from wholesome
entertainment for all ages to devices for gambling. It undermines public confidence in
the character of professional and amateur sports... [and] will promote gambling among
our Nation's young people. . . . Governments should not be in the business of
encouraging people, especially young people, to gamble.
Id. at 5.
42. S. REP. No. 102-248, at 6 (1991).
43. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-04 (2012).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012). It is also unlawful for a government entity to advertise or
license such activity. See id.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012); S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8 (1991). Congress included the
grandfather provisions because it recognized, and was sensitive to, PASPA's potential adverse
economic impact on states operating legal sports wagering schemes at that time. See S. REP. NO.
102-248, at 8. Congress' concern of the impact on Nevada lead some to refer to PASPA as the "Las
Vegas Loophole." See Slavin, supra note 37, at 720, 735.
140
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Montana, Nevada, and Oregon-satisfied the exemption provision.4 6
But, recognizing the foreclosure of opportunities for the remaining
forty-six states, Congress provided a one-year window during which
states could have qualified for the exemption by establishing their own
sports-wagering schemes. 47  Congress specifically intended New
Jersey's Atlantic City as the primary beneficiary of this provision. 48 But
neither New Jersey nor any other state exercised this option.
49
Therefore, only Delaware, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon are exempt
from PASPA's prohibition.
50
Of the four exempted states, only Nevada and Delaware
currently exercise their sports-wagering allowances. 51 Pursuant to
Delaware's allowance, individuals in Delaware may participate in NFL
parlay betting only, excluding other betting schemes, betting on other
professional leagues, and betting on collegiate sports.52  Unlike
Delaware's single allowance, Nevada's allowance encompasses a broad
range of sports-wagering schemes, permitting wagering on both
professional and collegiate sporting events. 53 Only in Nevada may an
individual place a legal single-game wager on a collegiate sporting
46. See Ronald J. Rychlak, A Bad Bet: Federal Criminalization of Nevada's Collegiate
Sports Books, 4 NEV. L.J. 320, 323 (2004).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3). The one-year window began January 1, 1993 and expired
January 1, 1994. See id. Effectively, New Jersey, or any other state, would qualify for the
exemption by enacting legislation and actually operating a sports wagering scheme during that
window. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3)(A)-(B).
48. See David Waddell & Douglas L. Minke, Why Doesn't Every Casino Have a Sports
Book?: An Overview of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, GLOBAL GAMING Bus.,
July 2008, at 35, available at http://www.michigangaming.com/docs/Why%20doesnt%20every%
20casino%20have%20a/o2Osports%20betting.pdf. The Casino Association of New Jersey actively
participated in the legislative process for the enactment of PASPA when it testified against the
legislation, yet, did not assume an active role after PASPA's enactment by taking advantage of the
one year window. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 (1991); Waddell & Minke, supra, at 35.
49. See Waddell & Minke, supra note 48, at 35.
50. See Sports Betting, AM. GAMING ASS'N, http://www.americangaming.org/
government-affairs/key-issues/past-issues/sports-betting (last visited Sept. 5, 2013).
51. See STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 1, at 33. Oregon repealed its sports wagering
scheme in 2007. OR. REV. STAT. § 461.213 (repealed 2007); H.R. 2466, 73d Leg., 1st Sess. (Or. 2005).
Montana offers sports wagering "between pigs, gerbils, or hamsters." MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 23-5-502(1)(b) (2013). Therefore, in the context of sports wagering on events involving human
participants, Montana is not included for the purposes of this Note, even though the state does
have a legal sports-wagering regime. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-5-502 (2013).
52. See Office of the Comm'r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 304 (3d Cir. 2009).
Parlay betting is where a bettor places a single wager on one event that joins other individual
wagers, and whether a bettor wins depends upon all of the individual wagers winning. See Parlay,
MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/parlay (last visited Sept. 6,
2013).
53. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 10 (1991); Kindt & Asmar, supra note 11, at 222, 232.
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event.54 Therefore, PASPA prohibits any type of wagering on collegiate
sporting events in the other forty-nine states and prevents any of those
states from legalizing such a scheme. 55
1. Challenges to PASPA
The persistence of illegal sports wagering led many states and
critics to question PASPA's constitutionality and effectiveness. 56
Critics proclaim that PASPA was controversial even before its
enactment, citing key constitutional concerns that included violations
of federalism principles and the Commerce Clause. 57 They question
how the government can enforce a federal ban when it does not hold all
states to the same standards. 58 Proponents for PASPA's repeal argue
that the provisions fail to serve their original purpose-stopping the
spread of illegal gambling-thus rendering the regulation ineffective. 59
Accordingly, these critics advocate a level playing field that would allow
other states' casinos to play by the same rules as their counterparts in
Nevada. 6
0
Since its enactment, PASPA has faced a few challenges, but only
the most recent challenges from New Jersey have constituted a
legitimate threat to the law.61 In 2009, New Jersey Senator Raymond
Lesniak challenged the constitutionality of PASPA, but the US District
54. See Suzette Parmley, New Jersey Makes its Final Appeal for Sports Betting,
PHILLY.COM (June 28, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-06-28business/40235411 1 amateur-
sports-protection-act-paspa-legalized-sports -wagering.
55. See Rychlak, supra note 46, at 323; cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
56. See, e.g., Michael Levinson, A Sure Bet: Why New Jersey Would Benefit from Legalized
Sports Wagering, 13 SPORTS L.J. 143, 169 (2006); Rychlak, supra note 46, at 323-24.
57. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12 (1991); see also Levinson, supra note 56, at 170 (quoting
Senator Charles Grassley's statement insisting that PASPA's passage "was an unconstitutional
infringement on states' rights and it unjustly discriminated among the states").
58. See Coltan Totland, New Jersey Puts Money on Legalizing Sports Betting, WASH.
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/l3/nj-makes-
constitutional-case-sports-betting/?page=all.
59. See Rychlak, supra note 46, at 323-24.
60. See, e.g., ASSOCIATED PRESS, New Jersey Sued Over Sports Betting, ESPN.COM (Aug.
7, 2012, 5:47 PM) [hereinafter New Jersey Sued Over Sports Betting],
http://espn.go.com/espn/story/ id/8243013/ncaa-4-pro-leagues-sue-new.jersey-sports-betting.
61. Prior to the challenge by New Jersey, Delaware unsuccessfully expanded its
allowance under PASPA beyond NFL parlay betting. See OFC Comm. Baseball v. Markell, 579
F.3d 293, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2009). In Markell, Delaware challenged the application of section
3704(a)(1), an exemption provision. See id. at 301. The Third Circuit held that Delaware's proposed
sports lottery would clearly violate federal law, as the exemption only applies to the extent such
scheme was actually conducted prior to PASPA's enactment. See id. at 304. The Third Circuit's
unwillingness to read PASPA broadly suggests that the exemption is to be construed narrowly-
only the states originally exempted have the authority to legalize sports wagering provided that
such scheme matches the characteristics of the scheme actually conducted prior to PASPA's. See
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Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the complaint for lack of
standing.62 In response to the dismissal, New Jersey amended its
Constitution, granting its state legislature the power to authorize
wagering "on the result of any professional, college, or amateur sport or
athletic event.' '6 3 Wanting to revive Atlantic City, New Jersey changed
its strategy in 2012 and opted to ignore PASPA outright rather than
challenge its constitutionality.64
2. New Jersey's Sports Wagering Act
On January 17, 2012, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
signed into law the Sports Wagering Act, permitting single-game sports
wagering at Atlantic City's casinos and racetracks. 65 Legislators chose
to ignore the federal ban in favor of the large potential upside sports
wagering could bring to New Jersey's economy.66 The Act's proponents
contend that this allowance "could generate an additional $225 million
a year for Atlantic City's casinos and racetracks." 67 Similar to Nevada's
allowances, the Sports Wagering Act permits wagering on both
professional and collegiate sporting events. 68  However, the Act
prohibits placing wagers on "any collegiate sport or athletic event that
takes place in New Jersey or a sport or athletic event in which any New
Jersey college team participates regardless of where the event takes
place."
69
Legalizing sports gambling in the state without first attempting
to nullify PASPA put New Jersey's state law in clear conflict with
PASPA. 70 Nevertheless, Governor Christie argues the legislation is
62. Interactive Media Entm't & Gaming Ass'n v. Holder, No. 09-1301, 2011 WL 802106,
at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011). The district court concluded that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the injuries
and redressability requirements-finding that they were at best speculative-because New Jersey
lacked any sports wagering legislation. See id. at *6.
63. N.J. CONST., art. IV, § 7, para. 2 (amended 2011).
64. See Chris Mondics, N.J. 's Legal Strategy in Its Sports-Betting Plan, PHILLY.COM (Aug.
13, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-08-13business/33168171 1 amatuer-sports-protection-
act.
65. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-1-6 (2012); see also New Jersey Sued Over Sports Betting,
supra note 60.
66. See Mondics, supra note 64 (suggesting New Jersey was "under pressure to revive
Atlantic City and boost state revenue"); see also Erin McClam, New Jersey Wages Federal Court
Battle to Allow Gambling on Sports, NBCNEWS.com (July 15, 2013, 4:24 AM),
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/-news/2013/07/15/19437131-new-jersey-wages-federal-court-battle-
to-allow-gambling-on-sports (noting that Atlantic City Casinos are down 40 percent).
67. See Mondics, supra note 64.
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-1 to -2 (2012). This would make New Jersey the only state
besides Nevada that permits sports wagering on collegiate sports. See Kindt & Asmar, supra note
11, at 222, 232.
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-1.
70. See New Jersey Sued Over Sports Betting, supra note 60.
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justifiable on fairness grounds because the federal government limits
such activity to only certain states for no legitimate purpose.7 1 He cites
the federal government's failure to "acknowledge that there is illegal
sports gambling going on in every state in America." And he asks "why
[legal gambling in New Jersey is] more injurious than illegal sports
gambling to the operations of the [professional] league[s] or the
NCAA?"72
In conjunction with New Jersey's legislation authorizing sports
wagering within the state, two New Jersey congressmen proposed bills
to the US House of Representatives that would amend section 3704(a)
of PASPA.7 3 The New Jersey Betting and Equal Treatment Act (BET
Act) calls for Congress to add New Jersey to the list of states exempted
from the federal prohibition of sports wagering.7 4 The Sports Gaming
Opportunity Act creates a four-year window applicable to all states,
analogous to the one-year window originally provided in section 3704.
75
3. Organizations Opposing the Repeal of PASPA
Consistent with their focus on the integrity of their respective
games, the NHL, the NFL, the NBA, MLB, and the NCAA (collectively,
"the Leagues") have sought to curtail or ban all state-sponsored
gambling on sporting events.7 6 Predictably, neither the New Jersey's
71. See id.
72. See id. (noting that Christie refers to the four main professional leagues: MLB, the
NBA, the NHL, and the NFL).
73. See Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2012, H.R. 3797, 112th Cong. (2012) ('To
amend chapter 178 of title 28 of the United States Code to permit during a 4-year period States to
enact statues that exempt from the operation of such chapter, lotteries, sweepstakes, and other
betting, gambling, or wagering schemes involving professional and amateur sports."); New Jersey
Betting and Equal Treatment Act of 2012, H.R. 3809, 112th Cong. (2012) ('To amend title 28 of
the United States Code to exclude the State of New Jersey from the prohibition on professional
and amateur sports gambling to the extent approved by the legislature of the State.").
74. See H.R. 3809. This narrowly tailored amendment applies to the allowance of"lottery,
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme" specifically in New Jersey. Id.
75. See H.R. 3797. The bill addresses the issue by providing every state the opportunity
to join the four exempted states and authorize sport-wagering schemes. Compare id. (creating a
four-year window), with 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012) (creating a one-year window). If passed, the Sports
Gaming Opportunity Act provides states interested in legalizing gambling the opportunity to do
so. H.R. 3797. While not an immediate effect, the potential spread of sports wagering could create
a gambling environment much like that in Great Britain, where small betting parlors cover city
blocks. See Dan Wetzel, Multinational Companies Lining Up to Cash in Big ifAmerican Gambling
Sports Landscape Opens, YAHOO! SPORTS (Oct. 15, 2012), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nfl--
multinational-companies-lining-up-to-cash-in-big-if-american-gamblingsports-landscape-
opens25191010.html.
76. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, NCAA v. Christie, No. 12-
4947 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 6698684 ("Gambling on amateur and professional sports..
. is fundamentally at odds with the principle . . . that the outcomes of collegiate and professional
144
2013] COVERING THE SPREAD
Sports Wagering Act, nor the proposed BET Act gained approval by the
sports community at large. 77 On August 7, 2012, four professional
sports organizations and the NCAA 78 filed suit in the US District Court
for the District of New Jersey seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
to enjoin the state of New Jersey from implementing and enforcing the
Sports Gambling Law and Sports Gambling Regulations. 79  The
Leagues contend that permitting the Sports Wagering Act, which
effectively would repeal PASPA, will "engender the very ills that
PASPA sought to combat."80
In their complaint in NCAA v. Christie, the Leagues allege that
permitting New Jersey to legalize sports wagering will cause
irreparable damage to the integrity of, and fans' respect for, the game.
81
Although legal, sports-gambling schemes produce negative stereotypes
and reputations that may yield long-term economic harm to the
Leagues. 2 This potential economic harm is separate and distinct from
the message such schemes convey to America's youth-the youth who
aspire to compete at the collegiate level.8 3 Due to these concerns, the
NCAA embraces a broad opposition to sports wagering.
8 4
athletic contests must be determined, and must be perceived by the public as being determined,
solely on the basis of honest athletic competition.").
77. See generally id. at 1-4, 10-11 (detailing the arguments made on behalf of the
Leagues to enjoin New Jersey's law).
78. All five organizations have standing to bring the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2012).
79. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 76, at 11.
80. NCAA v. Christie, No. 12-4947, 2012 WL 6698684, at *24 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012)
(noting that the "very ills" refers to government sponsorship and advertising sports gambling).
81. E.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 76, at 3. In response
to a 2009 survey conducted by the NBA, "17% of the Leagues' fans responded they would spend
less money on the Leagues if they placed a professional sports team in close proximity to legalized
sports gambling." NCAA v. Christie, No. 12 4947 (Dec. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 6698684, *9.
82. See Richard H. McLaren, Is Sport Losing Its Integrity?, 21 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 551,
559-60 (2011).
83. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5-7 (1991); See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief, supra note 76, at 3.
We must do everything we can to keep sports clean so that the fans, and especially
young people, can continue to have complete confidence in the honesty of the players
and the contests. Scandals in the sporting world are big news and can have a
devastating effect on the outlook of our youth to whom sports figures are heroes and
idols.
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 6 (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating of New York).
84. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, §§ 10.02.1-.2, 10.3.1-.2 (prohibiting the
placement, acceptance, or solicitation of a wager on any practice or competition, assisting in a
gambling scheme, and the provision of information to individuals participating in sports wagering,
even if done through an intermediary party).
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D. The NCAA and Sports Wagering
Since its inception in 1906, the NCAA has framed its primary
goal as the protection of student-athletes from exploitation on- and
off-the-field.85 In furtherance of this goal, the NCAA commits to
fostering clean and fair competition among member schools.8 6 The
NCAA links this notion of competitive equity to the integrity of college
sports.8 7 An athlete who plays for the love of the game, who seeks "to
be worthy of admiration" by winning fairly without inviting "skepticism
and innuendo" upholds the integrity of the game.88  But when
surprising or even extraordinary outcomes provoke skepticism rather
than admiration, suspicions that a game is rigged can overshadow
good-faith performances on the playing field.8 9
1. Protecting the Integrity of the Game
To maintain competitive equity, "[tlhe NCAA believes sports
should be appreciated for the benefits of participating or watching, not
the amount of money that can be won or lost depending on the outcome
of games."90 The NCAA cannot control whether the public gambles on
the outcome of games; however, it can control how the games are
played-with honesty and sportsmanship. 91 In light of these principles,
85. See About the NCAA, NCAA (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcmconnect/
public/ncaalabout+the+ncaa/history. In 1905, a group of thirteen University Presidents met to
discuss solutions to remedy the public's concern about the violent nature of football and demand
for reform or absolute abolishment. See id. Responding to their concerns, the University Presidents
established an institution to govern intercollegiate athletics, thus creating the "American marriage
of academics and athletics," a framework still in use today. See JOHN U. BACON, THREE AND OUT:
RICH RODRIGUEZ AND THE MICHIGAN WOLVERINES IN THE CRUCIBLE OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL 15
(2011).
86. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 2.10 (defining the principle of competitive
equity); Enforcement, NCAA (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/
enforcement/index.html.
87. See Enforcement, supra note 86 ('The NCAA upholds that principle by enforcing
membership-created rules that ensure equitable competition and protect the well-being of
student-athletes at all member institutions.").
88. Cf. McLaren, supra note 82, at 557.
89. Id. (addressing concerns about performance-enhancing drugs and their effect on the
perception of player integrity); see also Slavin, supra note 37, at 715 ("And while we may never
know if that missed shot at the buzzer was intentional, to think that it couldn't happen would be
both foolish and [naive].").
90. Behind the Blue Disk: Gambling on College Sports - What's the Big Deal?, NCAA (Oct.
15, 2010) [hereinafter Gambling on College Sports], available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/
connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Behind+the+Blue+Disk/Behind+the+Blue+Disk+-+Gambling
+on+College+Sports.
91. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 10.01.1 (recognizing the "honor and dignity of
fair play and the generally recognized high standards associated with wholesome competitive
sports").
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the NCAA implemented regulations focused specifically on holding
players and coaches accountable for their unethical conduct.
92
Pursuant to NCAA Bylaw 10.3, it is unethical for certain individuals to
engage in sports wagering.93 The bylaw prohibits student-athletes and
school officials from "knowingly participat[ing] in sports wagering
activities [and] provid[ing] information to individuals . . . concerning
intercollegiate, amateur, or professional athletics competition."94 The
NCAA defines sports wagering as:
[Pilacing, accepting or soliciting a wager (on a staff member's or student-athlete's own
behalf or on the behalf of others) of any type with any individual or organization on any
intercollegiate, amateur or professional team or contest. Examples of sports wagering
include, but are not limited to, the use of a bookmaker or parlay card; Internet sports
wagering; auctions in which bids are placed on teams, individuals or contests; and pools
or fantasy leagues in which an entry fee is required and there is an opportunity to win a
prize.... A wager is any agreement in which an individual or entity agrees to give up an
item of value (e.g., cash, shirt, dinner) in exchange for the possibility of gaining another
item of value.
9 5
The NCAA severely punishes any student-athlete violators by
permanently rescinding their eligibility to participate in intercollegiate
competition in any sport.96 The NCAA also shares the results of
sports-wagering investigations with the FBI, adding federal
prosecution to the list of potential repercussions for a student-athlete's
92. See id. § 10.1 (providing examples of prohibited unethical conduct).
93. Id. § 10.3. The NCAA defines individuals as "(a) Staff members of an institution's
athletics department; (b) Nonathletics department staff members who have responsibilities within
or over the athletics department (e.g., chancellor or president, faculty athletics representative,
individual to whom athletics reports); (c) Staff members of a conference office; and (d) Student-
athletes." Id. § 10.3(a)-(d). The NCAA extends its regulations to referees and requires background
checks on referees officiating certain championship sporting events. See McLaren, supra note 82,
at 566; Gambling on College Sports, supra note 90. Scandals involving referees illustrate the
impact of such malfeasance on fans' suspicions of unfair play and the possibility that someone
besides players can affect the outcome of an athletic competition. See McLaren, supra note 82, at
566.
94. Id. § 10.3; see Sports Wagering. Frequently Asked Questions, NCAA,
http://www.bsubeavers.com/media/Compliance/Student%20Athete%2Wagering%20FAQs.pdf
(last visited Sept. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Sports Wagering FAQs] (including disclosure of injury
updates, disciplinary actions, and new plays or schemes as part of the prohibition for sharing
information).
95. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 10.02.1 to .2.
96. See id. § 10.3.2 (describing different sanctions depending on the degree of involvement
in sports wagering activities). The NCAA established a set of broad enforcement policies and
procedures in order to accommodate for the breadth of violations and degree of severity. See id. §§
19.3-19.5. The magnitude of the punishment may depend on factors like the frequency of the
incident, if the incident occurs in isolation, or if there was a general blatant disregard of the
NCAA's governing rules. See id. § 19.01.5.
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involvement in gambling.97  Each season, the NCAA educates
student-athletes on the consequences of participating, in any degree, in
sports-wagering activities.98 It stresses to student-athletes that the
stigma of participating in illegal sports-wagering activities follows them
after leaving college and could adversely affect job prospects and
foreclose opportunities that would have otherwise been available to
them.99 Yet, underlying the threat of sports wagering to the integrity
of the game is the unique threat to the NCAA's foundational ideal of
amateurism. 100
2. Preserving the Ideal of Amateurism
The NCAA's founders designed the NCAA to "maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate
athletics and professional sports."1 01  In furtherance of this
demarcation, the NCAA forbids student-athletes from receiving
benefits, monetary or non-monetary, as a result of performing
in a sport. 10 2 The NCAA stands firmly on this prohibition in spite of
critics and current and former student-athletes calling for a change to
the status quo. 10
3
The dispute over whether student-athletes should receive
payment is the essence of O'Bannon v. NCAA, an antitrust lawsuit filed
by former and current players pertaining to the licensing and use of
players' names and likenesses.1 0 4 In O'Bannon, the players claim they
are entitled to compensation for the licensing and use of their names
97. See Latest News, NCAA (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/
wcmlconnect/public/NCAA[ResourceslLatest+News/201 l/AprilINCAA+point+shaving+threatens+
college+sports.
98. The Committee on Sportsmanship and Ethical Conduct is responsible for "promoting
sportsmanship and ethical conduct," which the NCAA described to include equitable competition
and prohibition of sports wagering activities. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 21.2.8.2.
99. See Sports Wagering FAQs, supra note 94. Furthermore, organized crime often funds
sports wagering, rendering it a possible gateway into further exploitation. See id.
100. See infra Part I.D.2.
101. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1.3.1. The NCAA devoted Article Twelve of the
Division I NCAA Bylaws to defining amateurism, and listing the types of behavior and conduct
that cause a student-athlete to lose his amateur status, and thus become ineligible for
intercollegiate competition. See id. § 12.
102. See id. §§ 12.1.2, 12.1.2.1.5.
103. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010);
see also Andy Staples, Delany: Big Ten Could De-Emphasize Athletics if O'Bannon Plaintiffs Win,
SI.COM (Mar. 19, 2013, 9:52 AM) [hereinafter Staples, Big Ten Could De-Emphasize Athletics],
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news/20130318big-ten-jim-delany-ncaa-obannon.
104. See O'Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, *3.
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and images in a college-football based video game. 10 5 While the players
acknowledge that the payment may interfere with the NCAA's
promotion of amateurism, they propose that the NCAA establish a trust
that would pay student-athletes for the use of their images during their
collegiate career, accessible upon graduation. 10 6 But neither the NCAA
nor many of the athletic conferences approve of a trust, because it
constitutes a performance-related payment. 10 7 From their perspective,
"educational and lifetime economic benefits associated with a university
education are the appropriate quid pro quo for its student-athletes."'
0 8
The ideal of amateurism distinguishes the NCAA's
apprehension towards sports gambling from that of professional sport
leagues. 109 Unlike professional athletes, student-athletes may not
receive any performance-related compensation. 110  In addition to
105. See id. The suit, originally filed in 2009, emphasizes the common sentiment felt by
players, that they should receive compensation for the universities' and the NCAA's use of their
images. See id. In light of the O'Bannon case, the NCAA announced in July of 2013 its decision to
not to renew a licensing contract with EA Sports for the use of the NCAA's name and logo in the
NCAA Football video game. Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Will Not Renew EA Sports Contract
(July 7, 2013), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/
latest+news/2013/july/ncaa+will+not+renew+ea+sports+contract.
106. See Notice of Motion and Motion by Antitrust Plaintiffs for Class Certification and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, in re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litigation, 2012 WL 4043912 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012) (No. 4:09-cv-1967 CW
(NC)). Granting class certification with respect to the injunctive relief sought in O'Bannon, US
District Court Judge Wilken addressed the possibility of student-athletes pursuing "group
licensing deals for the use of their names, images and likenesses in videogames and game
broadcasts." In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. C 09-1967
CW, 2013 WL 5979327, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013). This procedural partial-victory for current
athletes provoked speculation about an eventual trade associations or union that might represent
students' interests by facilitating these collective licensing arrangements. See, e.g., Michael
McCann, Judge Partially Certifies Class Action Status in O'Bannon Suit, SI.CoM (Nov. 9, 2013,
12:41 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-basketball/news/20131 109/obannon-ncaa-
class-action-lawsuit. No such trade association exists; however, the certification and the
speculation it triggered suggest that change to the status quo is inevitable, even if its ultimate
form is unpredictable.
107. See Staples, Big Ten Could De-Emphasize Athletics, supra note 103 ("[A]ny outcome
that results in athletes getting a piece of the schools' television revenue could force the schools of
the Big Ten to de-emphasize athletics."); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 12.1.2(b) (prohibiting
the "accept[ance] of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate
athletics participation").
108. Staples, Big Ten Could De-Emphasize Athletics, supra note 103.
109. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 2.9 ("Student-athletes shall be amateurs ...
motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.
. . . [S]tudent-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises.").
110. Compare id., § 12.02.4 (defining professional athlete as "one who receives any kind of
payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as permitted by the governing
legislation of the Association"), with id. § 12.1.2(a)-(g) (listing the various reasons when an
individual loses amateur status, including when an individual "uses his or her athletics skill
(directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport"). Article 15 of the NCAA manual regulates
the receipt of financial aid, providing the maximum limits, the permissible types, and the terms
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receiving a substantial salary for their performance,111 professional
athletes retain the opportunity to increase their incomes through
endorsement deals-an opportunity not afforded to college athletes.
11 2
The financial incentive for players to participate in illegal schemes is
therefore proportionally higher for college athletes than for professional
athletes. 113  The NCAA recognizes that "[f]inancially troubled
student-athletes are viewed by organized gambling as easy marks for
obtaining inside information or affecting the outcome of a game."
114
Thus, the NCAA and member institutions actively educate
student-athletes to increase their awareness of sports-wagering
activities.
115
and conditions of awarding institutional financial aid. See id. § 15. The NCAA does not consider
athletic scholarships as a prohibited financial benefit, allowing such aid to cover tuition and
institutional fees, room and board, books, and other expenses related to attendance so long as the
aid does not exceed the value of the cost of attendance. See id. §§ 15.1, 15.2.1 to 2.4. The NCAA
even allows the combination of athletic scholarships, academic scholarships, and permitted
additional financial aid so long as the total receipt of aid does not exceed the value of the cost of
attendance. See id. § 15.1.
111. For example, in 2012 the minimum base salary for a rookie in the NFL was $390,000.
See DJ Gallo, NFL Should Pay Players in Bounties, ESPN (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/espn/page2/story/ id/7647758/nfl-pay-all-players-performance-based-bounties.
112. Student-athletes may pursue endorsement deals, or even professional contracts for
that matter; however, the consequence of such action is the loss of their eligibility to participate in
intercollegiate competitions. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 12.1.2. The NCAA permits the
use of a student-athlete's likeness on sports related educational materials like books and films
provided that the student-athlete does not "expressly or implicitly endorse a commercial product
or service." Id. § 12.5.1.5(b). Due to the NCAA's strict rules governing eligibility and amateurism,
some athletes forgo their college eligibility to see immediate economic returns on their athletic
ability by signing professional contracts. See Tim Layden, Catch Her If You Can, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 9, 2003, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/
magazine/MAG1028917/index.htm.
113. Professional athletes obviously still have financial incentives to engage in illegal
gambling activities. See McLaren, supra note 82, at 565. But, the absence of legitimate avenues
for student-athletes to earn money while retaining their eligibility makes student-athletes
uniquely vulnerable. For a look into the vulnerability of professional athletes, see ESPN 30 for 30.
Broke (ESPN television broadcast 2012).
114. Gambling on College Sports, supra note 90. Three reasons student-athletes are easy
targets include:
(1) the money and goods that fixers promise to supply in exchange for their cooperation,
(2) the players are invariably young, and this lack of maturity may have some part in
their willingness to assume the risks entailed in illegal schemes presented to them, and
(3) many are from modest socio-economic backgrounds and lack alternative means for
earning money.
See Rychlak, supra note 46, at 332.
115. See Gambling on College Sports, supra note 90; College Sports Betting. NCAA Official
Statement, https:H/admin.xosn.com/pdf8/769641.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2013). The NCAA created
website, "Don't Bet On It," educates athletes, coaches, and staff on the risks associated with sports
wagering. For example, it provides the consequences and punishments for violations with the
NCAA's ban, therefore eliminating the excuse that they did not know the rules and repercussions.
See DON'T BET ON IT, http://dontbetonit.org/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2013). In addition to
educational presentations during the season, the NCAA partners with the FBI to conduct
150
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3. Understanding the Boundaries of Its Authority
The NCAA strives to promote the ideal of the student-athlete
through its rule-making and enforcement regime. 116 The NCAA's
promulgation of rules and regulations derive from its "mission ... to be
an integral part of higher education and to focus on the development of
[its] student-athletes."' 1 7 Thus, to establish uniformity across member
schools, the NCAA created a Constitution and Bylaw Manual to provide
a baseline for governing intercollegiate competition, student-athlete
conduct, and staff conduct.118 When joining the NCAA, each member
agrees to adhere to the manual, which means that in the realm of
collegiate sports, this manual is the law.11 9 But the manual is also the
NCAA's Achilles' heel because it binds only its member schools and
student-athletes and not the other parties involved in sports
gambling.1
20
The NCAA functions as a legislative body, but it wields no
authority beyond its member schools.1 21 It may educate the public,
politicians, and legislators, but it cannot force its rules on them.
122
Unfortunately for the NCAA, the greatest sanction it may impose is the
expulsion of a member school.1 23 Recognizing that illegal gambling is a
federal offense, and its own inability to prosecute individuals and
enterprises outside of its jurisdiction, the NCAA cooperates with the
FBI and other law-enforcement agencies to combat unlawful
gambling.124 Similarly, the NCAA recently established a relationship
education presentations to teams competing in championship games. See College Sports Betting,
supra.
116. See Enforcement, supra note 86; About the NCAA, supra note 85 (discussing the
implementation of a divisional regime, control of television rights, and creation of the NCAA
Council to deal with violations of the NCAA rules).
117. On the Mark, NCAA (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connectpublic/
NCAA/NCAA+President/On+the+Mark.
118. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15.
119. See id. § 1.3.2 ("Member institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this
legislation ... ").
120. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
121. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197 (1988) (noting that the NCAA enjoys no
governmental powers when conducting investigations); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, §§ 5.2-5.4
(establishing the procedures for creating constitutions, operating and administrative bylaws,
enforcement polices and procedures, and resolutions).
122. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 197 ("[The NCAA] had no power to subpoena witnesses,
to impose contempt sanctions, or to assert sovereign authority over any individual.").
123. See id.
124. See Latest News, supra note 97. The NCAA informs the FBI and US Attorney General
advisory groups on suspicions of sports wagering and organized crime. See id. The NCAA engages
in its investigation only after the FBI and U.S. Attorney General conclude their investigation. See
id. This Note treats the NCAA's jurisdiction as limited to its member institutions, which includes
those individuals defined in section 10.3 of the NCAA's Manual.
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with Nevada gaming officials to develop "a better mutual
understanding of the wagering activity and trends on NCAA contests
in sports books." 125  Although lacking binding authority beyond
academia is an obvious weakness, the NCAA can implement a regime
to directly protect its members from any sports-wagering scheme. 26
II. THE INFLUENCE OF SPORTS WAGERING ON THE MODERN
STUDENT-ATHLETE
A. The Potential Effect of the Expansion of Legalized Sports Wagering
on the NCAA
Although the district court's ruling in NCAA v. Christie was
unfavorable for states interested in legalizing sports wagering, states
will not throw in the towel yet. 12 7 New Jersey appealed the district
court's ruling, feeling "confident that the [US Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit] will conclude that New Jersey should be treated equally
with other states."128 The Third Circuit, however, affirmed the district
court's determination that New Jersey's law must yield to PASPA.1 29
Despite the Third Circuit's decision, other interested states are in
positions to improve on New Jersey's strategy when preparing their
own contentions against PASPA.130 While New Jersey attacked the
validity of the asymmetrical federal ban by passing an instantly
preempted state law, other states may abandon a direct challenge
entirely and propose bills like the Sports Gaming Opportunity Act to
125. Id.; see NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-6 ("State regulators often rely upon
the casinos to maintain logs that document irregularities and to 'self-report' violations.").
126. Despite its inability to create law, the NCAA operates as a rulemaking body for its
members, creating committees and promulgating procedures for investigation and enforcement of
infractions. See Behind the Blue Disk: NCAA Rules Enforcement: For the Good of the Game, NCAA
(June 21, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connectlpublic/NCAA/ResourceslBehind+the+
Blue+DiskINCAA+Rules+Enforcement+For+the+Good+of+the+Game [hereinafter For the Good of
the Game].
127. Many states besides New Jersey desire to capitalize on the lucrative sports wagering
industry and they eagerly sat on the sidelines waiting to see how New Jersey's anti-PASPA
litigation strategy played out in federal court. See, e.g., Sieroty, supra note 6 (noting California's
consideration of a bill that will legalize sports betting).
128. Hillary Russ, NJ to Appeal Ruling that Keeps Ban on Sports Betting: Christie,
REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/02/us-newjersey.
gambling-sports-idUSBRE92100020130302.
129. NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3rd Cir. 2013), affg NCAA v.
Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d. 551 (D.N.J. 2013).
130. See Waddell & Minke, supra note 48, at 36; see also Joe Drape, Cash-Hungry States
Eye Sports Betting, to Leagues' Dismay, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/sports/more-states-look-to-get-in-the-sports-betting-game
.html (discussing how states like Illinois and California are considering introducing bills to allow
sports wagering).
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amend section 3704(a) of PASPA to create a new window for states to
grandfather in their desired sports-wagering schemes.1
31
Despite the narrow scope of the NCAA's binding authority, the
NCAA still has a defense against states that choose to legalize sports
gambling: prohibiting the performance of championship athletic events
within the state. 132 The NCAA's antagonism towards legalized sports
wagering is most focused in its opposition to wagering on collegiate
sporting events. 133  New Jersey insists that a legalized
sports-wagering regime would not threaten the integrity of the game
and that the real threat is illegal wagering. 13 4 New Jersey claims the
Leagues can avoid any harm by policing their players and referees. 135
But New Jersey fails to recognize that "[tihe Leagues' referees and
players need not actually engage in gambling or game fixing in order
for fans to have an increased perception that the integrity of the game
is suffering due to the expansion of legalized gambling."
1 36
The substantive implications of New Jersey's Sports Wagering
Act seem to validate, rather than discredit, the Leagues' evaluation of
risk. 137 The state's exclusion of its own teams from its allowance might
reflect an effort to insulate its teams from the implicit threat of sports
131. Cf. Sport Gaming Opportunity Act of 2012, H.R. 3797, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposing
an amendment to section 3704(a) that creates another window in which states could legalize sports
wagering).
132. See Sports Wagering Law Forces NCAA to Remove Championships from New Jersey,
NCAA (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+
News/2012/October/Sports+wagering+law+forces+NCAA+to+remove+championships+from+New
+Jersey (removing six Division I, II, and III championship events from New Jersey pursuant to
NCAA policy). The NCAA also requires men's and women's basketball event certification to ensure
that the "event shall not be conducted in a venue where sports wagering on intercollegiate athletics
is permitted, or on property sponsored by an establishment that permits sports wagering." NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 15, §§ 13.18(g), 13.19(g), 13.20(g).
133. Although the NCAA's prohibition includes wagering on professional sporting events,
see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 10.3.1, the NCAA does not prohibit Nevada or Delaware from
hosting championship events.
134. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Complaint at 18, NCAA v. Christie, No. 3:12-cv-4947 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012), 2012 WL 4804067
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum].
135. NCAA v. Christie, No. 12-4947, 2012 WL 6698684, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012). Even
during the discussion of enacting PASPA, the legislators acknowledged that "[1legalization of
sports gambling would not reduce illegal sports gambling in a State." S. REP. No. 102-248, at 7
(1991).
136. Christie, 2012 WL 6698684, at *8. According to a 2009 NBA Integrity Study,
"[sjpecifically, 33% of NBA fans, 15% of NFL fans, 13% of MLB fans, 7% of NHL fans, 18% of NCAA
Basketball fans and 15% of NCAA Football fans thought game fixing was problematic. Gambling
was cited as a problem among 36% of NBA fans, 26% of NFL fans, 28% of MLB fans, 15% of NHL
fans, 22% of NCAA Basketball fans and 22% of NCAA Football fans." Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
137. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-1 (2012) (prohibiting the placement of wagers on any
sporting event in New Jersey or involving a New Jersey college team); supra text accompanying
notes 81-83 (discussing the Leagues' concerns).
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wagering on the integrity of college sports. 138 Perhaps if a state adopted
a legalized sports-wagering scheme that banned all collegiate sports
wagering, then the NCAA would not remove championship events from
the state. 139 This would be reasonable if the NCAA was only interested
in discouraging states from adopting collegiate sports wagering. 140 But,
the NCAA's refusal to allow championship games in
Oregon-an exempted state-while it operated a wagering scheme
limited to NFL games suggests a broader campaign.141 Even with a
narrowly tailored allowance for a professional sporting scheme, the
NCAA's campaign against sports wagering created public pressure for
Oregon to repeal the legislation.
1 42
Whether or not federal or state legislation prohibits sports
wagering after any given case or legislative session, the NCAA cannot
guarantee the laws will remain in effect any more than it can expect
illegal gambling to disappear entirely.1 43 The NCAA cannot stop people
beyond its reach from placing wagers.1 44 The billions of dollars that US
gamblers wager each year illustrate that an illegal market does not just
survive, it thrives.145 In short, the NCAA should not celebrate a
favorable outcome in the courtroom; rather, the NCAA should
anticipate future challenges to PASPA as well as persistent illegal
gambling because "[als long as you have a prohibition you're going to
have bootleggers."1
46
B. The NCAA's Response to the Persistence of an Illegal Market for
Sports Wagering
The key question before the NCAA is whether the legalization of
sports wagering poses a legitimate threat to the NCAA's mission to
protect and preserve the integrity of its games and the
138. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 76, at 7.
139. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-1 (limiting, but not banning outright, wagering on
collegiate sports).
140. But see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, §§ 10.02.1-2, 10.3.1-.2 (defining prohibition
of sports wagering broadly); Waddell & Minke, supra note 48, at 36 (noting that regardless of a
state's strategy, the state "should expect a well-funded and determined battle from the NCAA...
[since it is] vehemently opposed to expansion").
141. See Waddell & Minke, supra note 48, at 35.
142. See H.R. 3466-73, 73d Leg., 1st Sess. (Or. 2005); Waddell & Minke, supra note 48, at
35.
143. See supra Part I.D.3.
144. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
145. See The Big Business of Illegal Gambling, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/34039744/
Crime IncTheBigBusiness of Illegal_- Gambling (last visited Sept. 5, 2013).
146. The NCAA's Black Market, NATIONAL COLLEGE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION [hereinafter
NCAA's Black Market], available at http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/TheNCAAsBlackMarket.pdf
(last visited Sept. 5, 2013).
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student-athletes. 147  One argument is that because illegal markets
exist, legalizing sports wagering would add little, if any, harm. 148 This
argument is flawed.1 49  Just because the NCAA cannot feasibly rid
society, or even college campuses, of all forms of illegal gambling does
not mean it cannot eliminate one risk particular to collegiate sports.
For example, the NCAA forbids players and coaches from engaging in
sports-wagering activities; however, its limited influence prevents it
from targeting outsiders who take advantage of vulnerable
student-athletes. 150  Yet, if sports wagering is legalized, players may
succumb to an illusion that their participation in it is acceptable,
believing that widespread legalization displaces the NCAA's
prohibition. 151
The amount of money wagered illegally significantly exceeds
legal wagers on collegiate sporting events. 152  Part of this large
discrepancy derives from the lack of public awareness of the legal
implications of illegal sports wagering. 15 3 While the NCAA and member
institutions expend resources to educate student-athletes on the risks
of sports wagering, 154 many members of the general public engage in
illegal sports wagering casually by participating in office pools for
basketball championships or filling in squares for the Super Bowl.
155
Since forty-eight states authorize legalized gambling in one form or
another, 156 the public may also find it difficult to distinguish the risks
147. See supra Parts I.D.1-2 (describing the basis of the NCAA's mission).
148. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum, supra note 134, at 18-19.
149. See id.
150. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 10.3(a)-(d); supra Part I.D.3 (discussing the
NCAA's limited authority).
151. Cf. Kindt, Failure to Regulate, supra note 9, at 230 ("[S]ports gambling [is] causing
adolescents to become 'the first U.S. generation in 100 years raised to believe that legalized
gambling [is] an acceptable activity and [has] career opportunities."'). In the 2012 NCAA Study,
the majority of Division I male and female student-athletes surveyed agreed with the statements
"most athletes in college violate NCAA rules prohibiting sports wagering" and "people can
consistently make a lot of money gambling." 2012 NCAA GAMBLING STUDY, NCAA RESEARCH
(2013), available at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/public/pdf/ncaa-wagering-prelim-may2013.pdf. This
result should be troubling to the NCAA. If student-athletes acknowledge the potential financial
upside when sports gambling is unlawful, it seems like more athletes would be at risk of
participating in sports-wagering activities should such activities become legal.
152. For example, during the 2000 NCAA Men's Division I Basketball Championship
Tournament, popularly known as March Madness, Nevada recorded $172.4 million dollars in legal
sports wagers. See Goldstein, supra note 33. More impressively, however, the FBI estimates that
on average more than $2.5 billion is wagered illegally during March Madness each year. See Drape,
supra note 130.
153. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-14.
154. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
155. See Gambling on College Sports, supra note 90 ("Does the NCAA really oppose the
harmless small-dollar bracket office pool for the Men's Final Four? Yes! Office pools of this nature
are illegal in most states.").
156. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-1.
2013] 155
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
associated with gambling in general, and those specifically related to
sports wagering. 157
Relatedly, the deepening normative nature of sports wagering
on college campuses, and society as a whole, poses significant problems
for educators. 158 Despite the educational campaigns and regulations
prohibiting participation in sports-wagering activities, a 2012 NCAA
study reported that the percentage of male student-athletes who
self-reported engaging in social gambling increased in the last
decade.159 Those student-athletes who self-reported engaging in sports
wagering ranked NCAA presentations and NCAA educational
materials as two of the least effective methods for influencing
student-athletes to stop engaging in sports-wagering activities. 160 Even
though the study suggests that the NCAA's educational efforts are less
effective than desired, the NCAA should not slow down its efforts.
Given the increased accessibility of student-athletes through social
media, student-athletes become increasingly susceptible as targets to
outsiders seeking inside information.161
C. The NCAA's Actions May Perpetuate the Issues it is Trying to
Resolve
While the NCAA stresses the importance of maintaining its
student-athletes' amateur status, many scholars critique, and some
blame, its model of amateurism for the black market in collegiate
sports.162  The NCAA states that "[s]tudent participation in
157. See id. at 2-14.
158. See NCAA RESEARCH, supra note 151 (noting that the majority of collegiate
student-athletes believe that "sports wagering is a harmless pastime."). Moreover, 41 percent of
male and 26 percent of female student-athletes indicated their agreement with the statement that
"[clollege coaches [believe] sports wagering [is] acceptable so long as you don't bet on your own
games." Id.
159. See id. The survey defines three categories of gambling: social, frequent, and heavy.
Id. Social gambling refers to gambling on one or more occasions in the past year; frequent gambling
refers to gambling on one or more occasions each month during the past year; and heavy gambling
refers to gambling on one or more occasions each week during the past year. Id. Although the
percentage of males participating in social gambling increased over the last decade, the
preliminary statistics illustrate that the percentage of males engaging in frequent and heavy
gambling has decreased. Id.
160. Id. The top four methods ranked by male and female student-athletes as the most
effective ways to influence them were: coaches, teammates, NCAA penalties, and pro-athlete
presentations. Id. Female student-athletes listed law enforcement presentations as the fifth most
effective method, whereas male student-athletes listed their parents. Id.
161. See id.
162. See NCAA's Black Market, supra note 146 ("Through the NCAA, college presidents
mandate impoverished conditions for young, valuable players and throw money around to all other
college sports stakeholders when those players perform well, a formula that drives the powerful
black market that thrives at so many universities .... ").
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intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises."'163  But, the NCAA is itself a massive commercial
enterprise. 164 And, based on the significant expectations imposed on
student-athletes, characterizing their participation as a mere hobby is,
at best, misleading. 165 In light of the NCAA's strict no-settlement
stance in O'Bannon, its own actions lend support to the argument that
the NCAA must protect student-athletes from itself.1 66 Finding an
appropriate solution comes down to understanding which values the
NCAA prefers more: the financial stability of its student-athletes or the
demarcation between professional and collegiate sports.
1. Undervaluing the Financial Vulnerability of Student-Athletes
Despite recognizing of the financial vulnerability of
student-athletes, the NCAA does not accept responsibility for
student-athletes' financial position in the first place.1 67 According to a
study conducted by the National College Players Association (NCPA)
and Drexel University, many college players live below the federal
poverty line.168 The study compared players' scholarships to a player's
cost of living and concluded that most athletic scholarships failed to
cover the essentials like food and clothing. 169 Student-athletes who
come from lower-income families may be more financially vulnerable,
and thus more at risk, because they lack the funds to cover the
163. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 2.9.
164. See College Athletics Revenues, supra note 14 (listing the 2008 revenues of Division I
athletic departments); infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing student-athletes' eligibility
requirements, class obligations, and team schedules).
166. See discussion infra Part 11.1.2.
167. Cf. BACON, supra note 85, at 350 (pointing out the argument that the NCAA and
member institutions' provisions of athletic scholarships to student-athletes allow some
student-athletes to continue their education past high school when they would not otherwise have
the means to do so).
168. See Ramogi Huma & Ellen Staurowsky, Study: College Athletes Worth 6 Figures, Live
Below Federal Poverty Line, NAT'L COLLEGE PLAYERS AsS'N, http://www.ncpanow.org/
releases advisories?id=0015 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013); Sheryl Nance-Nash, NCAA Rules Trap
Many College Athletes in Poverty, DAILY FINANCE (Sept. 13, 2011, 4:00 PM),
http://m.aol.com/dailyfinance/default/articleStory.do?category-main&url=http://www.dailyfinanc
e.com/2011/09/13/ncaa-rules-trap-many-college-athletes-in-poverty/&icid--dsk df news.
169. See NCAA's Black Market, supra note 146. Scholarships generally cover tuition, room,
board, and books, but do not cover incidents like the cost of living (i.e. phone bills, travel expenses,
groceries, etc.). See Tom Farrey, NCAA Might Face Damages in Hundreds of Millions, ESPN,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2337810 (last updated Feb. 21, 2006, 3:03 PM). The
scholarship package generally amounts to $2,500 per year less than the actual cost of attending
the university. See id. Over the course of four years, the small shortfall amounts to $10,000, which
the players must account for somewhere. See id.
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difference between their scholarships and living expenses, and their
student-athlete status deprives them of the opportunity to earn those
funds legally.170 Because of the strict training and studying schedules
student-athletes must follow, they have little time for paid work. 171
Although some student-athletes may receive additional financial aid,
others must find creative ways to compensate for a scholarship's
shortfall. 172 For instance, some take on credit card debt, while others
resort to criminal activity, like gambling, to cover their debts. 173
The NCAA plays a large role in student-athletes' financial
statuses, as its rules govern the amount of athletic-based financial aid
student-athletes may receive and limit their ability to receive funding
while competing in collegiate sports. 174 The NCAA strictly regulates
student-athletes' ability to receive money and benefits, further
complicating their efforts to cover the shortfall of their scholarships. 175
These rules and restrictive schedules limit student-athletes in their
pursuit of employment opportunities during the academic year. 176
Although the NCAA does not directly prohibit student-athletes from
seeking employment, often it comes down to a matter of time-if
170. See Lawrence M. Kahn, The Economics of College Sports: Cartel Behavior vs.
Amateurism, (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA),
Discussion Paper No. 2186) (June 2006), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp2186.pdf ("[Tihe
widespread incidence of under the table payments for top college athletes suggests that total
allowable direct compensation plus the value of training and exposure are less than these players'
[marginal revenue products]."); see Farrey, supra note 169.
171. Cf. BACON, supra note 85, at 347-60 (detailing the daily schedule of a student athlete);
infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
172. See Rychlak, supra note 46, at 332 (positing reasons why student-athletes may engage
in sports wagering, which includes "lack[ing] alternative means for earning money").
Student-athletes may receive financial aid beyond their athletic scholarships in the form of certain
exempted government grants, aid from parents or legal guardians, or aid from an established and
continuing program so long as the aid is unrelated to athletic ability and does not exceed the cost
of attendance. NCAA Manual, supra note 15, §§ 15.1, 15.2.5 to 15.2.6. However, there are
limitations on a student-athlete's ability to take out a loan to cover the gap. Id. §§ 16.11.1.2 to
16.11.1.3.
173. See, e.g., Farrey, supra note 169 ("As a UCLA linebacker in the late 1990s, Ramogi
Huma left college after four years with $6,000 in credit card debt.").
174. Compare Behind the Blue Disk: How Do Athletic Scholarships Work?,
NCAA (June 11,2011), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/pdfs/
bluedisks/nov+2012/ncaa+athletics+scholarships ('The average value of a full scholarship at an in-
state, public school is $15,000 a year. For an out-of-state public school, the average value is $25,000
a year. Full scholarships at private schools average $35,000 a year."), with NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 15, § 12.1.2 (describing the types of non-permissible financial benefits).
175. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 12.1.2.
176. See Kahn, supra note 170 ("According to NCAA rules, athletes are limited to receiving
a scholarship and stipend, supplemented by up to $2,000 of earnings from a job during the school
year.").
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student-athletes are students first and athletes second, when do they
have time to be employees?
77
Additionally, the NCAA forbids student-athletes from receiving
any external economic benefits. 178 External benefits are not limited to
payments for performance; rather, the NCAA has gone so far as to
include receipts of groceries and airline tickets from neighbors as
violations of NCAA rules. 179 The lack of legitimate avenues open to
student-athletes in need of money may lead them to participate in
sports wagering as a method of last resort. 18 0 In this respect, the
NCAA's rules-rules designed to protect student-athletes-actually
make student-athletes vulnerable. People beyond the NCAA's reach
will reliably exploit that vulnerability, drawing relatively immature
student-athletes into illegal schemes that they are ill-equipped to resist
with risks that they may not fully comprehend.
181
2. Perception that the NCAA Exploits Student-Athletes
In light of the NCAA's and its conferences' television contracts,
some question how NCAA schools receive millions of dollars in profit,
177. The NCAA states that it designs rules governing playing and practice time to
minimize "interference with [student-athletes'] opportunities for acquiring a quality education in
a manner consistent with that afforded the general student body." NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15,
§ 2.14. But, the general student body possesses something that the student-athletes do not-time.
For a complete description of the requirements of student-athletes during and outside of playing
season, see NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 17. To be eligible to practice, student-athletes must
be enrolled as a full-time student pursuing a degree. Id. § 14.1.7.1. To be eligible to participate in
competitions, student-athletes must be enrolled as a full-time student and the program must not
be less than twelve credit hours. Id. § 14.1.7.2. During the season, the NCAA allows member
institutions to require practice time of a maximum of four hours a day, and twenty hours a week.
Id. § 17.1.6. Therefore between the twelve hours of class time (not including time allotted for
studying), twenty hours of practice time (not including compliance or academic meetings), and
travel time if the competition is away, there is little time remaining for student-athletes to seek
employment. E.g. BACON, supra note 85, at 347-60.
178. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 16.11.2. However, the NCAA makes exceptions
for participation and championship awards available to student-athletes. See id. at fig. 16-1. For
example, underclass student-athletes who win their conference championships and NCAA
championships have the opportunity to receive a combined participation and championship award
of $1,715 from their school and NCAA. See id.
179. See, e.g., Boise State WR Violates NCAA Rules, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
http://msn.foxsports.com/collegefootball/story/boise-state-wr-geraldo-boldewijn-to-miss-4-games-
for-ncaa-violation-080312 (updated Aug. 4, 2012, 12:08 AM) (describing suspension for accepting
financial assistance from host family to purchase flight to visit his family for the holiday).
180. Cf. Rychlak, supra note 46, at 332 (noting that a student-athlete's inability to find
other avenues to earn money makes her susceptible to engaging in sports wagering); supra notes
176-79 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of time to hold down a job during the season,
the salary limitations if a student-athlete finds a job, and the restrictions placed on receiving any
financial benefit, including anonymous gifts).
181. See Rychlak, supra note 46, at 332.
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pay their coaches high salaries, but pay players nothing. 18 2 In many
instances, student-athletes scrounge for pennies while the NCAA
records millions of dollars in media revenue. 183 Recently, the NCAA
signed television contracts with CBS valued at over $10 billion.'8 4 This
$10 billion figure does not even include the millions of dollars of revenue
from the television contracts the NCAA's individual conferences
signed, 185 which is estimated at $1.4 billion for the 2013-14 season
alone. 186
The juxtaposition of scholarship shortfalls with the billions of
dollars generated by the NCAA and its member schools through
commercial and broadcasting ventures triggers allegations of
student-athlete exploitation. 187  Exploitation through the use and
licensing of players names and likenesses is the heart of the plaintiffs'
complaint in O'Bannon.188 Although the case against the NCAA is
ongoing, the NCAA's co-defendant, EA Sports, reached a
182. See Craig Harris, BCS Brings in Big Money, But Is Under Scrutiny for Spending, USA
TODAY (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ollege/football/story/2011-09-27/bes-
spending-investigation-arizona-republic/50567498/1; Scott Mayerowitz, Millionaire Coaches,
Billion-Dollar TV Contracts and Zip for Players, ABC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=3000177 &page= 1.
183. Unfortunately, this is a common pattern. For example, the Fab Five, a nickname
given to five University of Michigan basketball players during the early 1990s, caught the national
media's attention. "Fans of all races and demographics spent millions of dollars on Michigan
jerseys, shorts and the like, trying to capture a tiny slice of the group's mystique." Thomas
Neumann, Michigan's Fab Five in Their Own Words, ESPN (Mar. 11, 2011),
http://sports.espn.go.comlespn/page2/story?page=neumannll10311 fab-five-documentary&sport
Cat=ncb. The University of Michigan profited from marketing the Fab Five, but the players
received no share of the revenue, and often times could not even afford to buy hamburgers at
McDonald's. See Dan Wetzel, Chris Webber Deserves Apology from Michigan, NCAA for
Disassociation Treatment, YAHOO (May 8, 2013), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/ncaab--ncaa--
michigan-should-be-apologizing-to-chris-webber-for--scarlet-letter--treatment-210316392.html.
184. Steve Berkowitz, Parts of NCAA's TV Contract with CBS, Turner Go Public, USA
TODAY SPORTS (Oct. 16, 2012, 8:04 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2012/10/16/
ncaa-tournament-turner-cbs-contract1637179.
185. For a breakdown of the conference television deals, see Chris Smith, The Most
Valuable Conferences in College Sports, FORBES.COM (Jan. 16, 2013, 10:57 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/20 1 3/01/16/the-most-valuable-conferences-in-college-
sports. The SEC's deal with CBS and ESPN is worth around $205 million per year, but the Big
Ten conference is currently the holder of the highest paid television contract, valued at $38 million
per year more than the SEC's contract. See id. The Big 12 and ACC conferences signed contracts
that will pay $17 million and $20 million per member school respectively. See id.
186. See id. ('The five most valuable conferences are set to collect over $1.4 billion this
year from bowls, tournaments and television; the bottom five ... have racked up a measly $175
million from the same sources.").





$40 million settlement. 8 9 Despite the NCAA's unwillingness to settle
the dispute over players' access to the television revenues, EA Sports'
settlement brings the issue into the spotlight. 190 Can the named current
players retain their amateur status and eligibility if settlement money
is placed in a trust?191
Aside from the NCAA's immediate concerns with respect to the
establishment of a trust for the current players named in O'Bannon, the
implications of class certification are far reaching.192 Given the partial
grant of certification, the NCAA remains open to liability, with the issue
of how to pay players any potential damages without jeopardizing their
amateur status at center court. 193 But certification coupled with a loss
for the plaintiffs would indirectly contribute to student-athletes'
financial vulnerability, as it would foreclose another avenue of relief
through which student-athletes may lessen the burden of their
scholarship deficiencies. 194 In either case, the aftermath of O'Bannon
will significantly impact whether the NCAA must reconsider its
definition of amateurism.
III. A CALL FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
During the century of the NCAA's existence, the public
witnessed significant rule changes to enhance player safety, growth in
the number of sports and scholarships member schools offer, and the
commercialization of college sporting events. 195  Despite these
adaptations to evolving societal norms, one thing remained
constant-the NCAA's definition of amateurism. 196 But the emergence
of a culture that accepts sports wagering, its implication on the
189. See Chris Fuhrmeister, $40 Million EA Sports, CLC Settlement Could Mean a Couple
Hundred Per Player, SBNATION.COM (Sept. 27, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2013/9/27/4777412/ea -sports-ncaa-players-settlement-40-million.
190. See id. The NCAA views any payment as amoral and in violation of the principle of
amateurism, so it seems unlikely that it will choose to forgo litigation and willingly establish a
trust without a fight. See id.
191. See id. ('The NCAA hasn't said whether or not it will allow current players to accept
money from the settlement. After all, that would compromise their amateur status, which really
illustrates the point of how dysfunctional the current structure of college athletics is.").
192. See, e.g., Andy Staples, Ed O'Bannon v. the NCAA: A Complete Case Primer, SICOM
(Apr. 2, 2013, 12:17 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.comcollege-football/news/20130402/ed-
obannon-ncaa-case-primer (discussing what may happen if the judge grants certification and if the
NCAA settles the case).
193. See id.
194. Cf. supra Part I.C. 1 (addressing the shortfall in athletic-based scholarships).
195. See, e.g., BACON, supra note 85, at 19-22, 349-50 (providing examples of such changes
such as the legalization of the forward pass in football to prevent collisions and the increase in cost
of tuition and value of scholarships).
196. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the NCAA's emphasis on the importance of
preserving of amateurism).
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vulnerability of student-athletes, and the deepening conversation about
player compensation through O'Bannon, suggests that the NCAA's
conception of amateurism must now adapt.197
The NCAA's main threat is not the legalization of sports
wagering but rather sports wagering generally. 198 Whether it is legal
or illegal, sports wagering threatens the integrity of collegiate
athletics. 199 While the degree of the risk may change depending on the
legality of gambling involved, the susceptibility of student-athletes'
involvement in such schemes remains two-fold-as targets of people
beyond the NCAA's reach and as active participants. 200
In light of the NCAA's binding authority over member schools
and criticisms that it exploits student-athletes, the NCAA is not only
the cause, but also the solution to its problems. 201  Rather than
continuing to invest resources in an attempt to enjoin the legalization
of sports wagering, the NCAA should concentrate on improving the
welfare of its student-athletes by refining its antiquated rules and
procedures. 20 2 Focusing specifically on financial vulnerability enables
the NCAA to mitigate the threats sports wagering poses to
student-athletes. Adopting a reasonable stipend to supplement athletic
scholarships would allow the NCAA to counter these threats without
abandoning its ideal of amateurism. 20 3
A. Refocus the Definition of Amateurism
Since a student-athlete's financial status contributes to her
vulnerability, arguably, improving student-athletes' financial stability
197. See infra Part III.A (proposing a relaxation on the NCAA's definition of amateurism).
198. See Udovicic, supra note 31, at 403 ("Sports gambling itself might not be evil, but
when the integrity of the sporting contests, that so many enjoy is questioned, something should be
done.").
199. In the Senate Report, the legislators acknowledged:
[I]lilegal entrepreneurs can always "outmarket" their legitimate counterparts, offering
credit, better odds, higher payout, and.., tax-free winnings. For this reason, legalized
sports gambling would likely draw new recruits to illegal gambling. As Francis T.
Vincent, Jr., the commissioner of baseball, testified, "once the moral status of sports
betting has been redefined by legalization .... many new gamblers will be created, some
of whom inevitably will seek to move beyond lotteries to wagers with higher stakes and
more serious consequences."
S. REP. No. 102-248, at 7 (1991).
200. See supra Parts II.C.1-2.
201. See supra Parts II.B, II.C. 1.
202. Even though the NCAA and professional leagues succeeded in enjoining New Jersey's
enforcement of the Sports Wagering Act, the battle is not over as many states and private interests
are attracted to the potential economic benefits associated with the repeal of PASPA. See supra
note 130 and accompanying text. Likewise, illegal gambling continues to exist despite federal
regulation. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
203. See infra Part III.B.
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will make them less vulnerable. 20 4 But the NCAA's rules so completely
inscribe student-athletes that improving their financial statuses
requires affirmative action by the NCAA to change those rules. 20 5 Since
the NCAA holds the authority to amend and create new rules and
regulations, no external barrier prevents the NCAA from allowing
member schools to increase the funds available to student-athletes
during their academic careers. 20 6 But, the NCAA ties its own hands
through its strict enforcement of an outdated model of amateurism that
ill-serves many student-athletes.
20 7
Publicly, the NCAA champions the ideal that student-athletes
be scholars first, athletes second. 20 This ideal embraces students from
varying socio-economic backgrounds who spend their day studying,
practicing, and competing for the love of the game, not the prospect of
making money. 20 9 It exists separate and distinct from the rigid
definition and continued eligibility requirements the NCAA describes
in its bylaws.210 The NCAA fears that adding money to the equation
will jeopardize the innocence and honesty associated with this ideal,
blurring the line between professional and collegiate athletics.
211
The NCAA, its member schools, and their commercial partners
already crossed that line by aggressively commercializing college
athletics. 212 The lingering question in O'Bannon on how to allocate any
potential settlement money without jeopardizing student-athletes'
eligibility, further implies that the NCAA should relax its definition by
de-emphasizing its demarcation of professional and collegiate
athletics.21 3 In redefining amateurism, the NCAA should focus on solely
reflecting the ideal of a student-athlete-an ideal that can exist with
controlled payments to student-athletes.
204. See supra Part II.C. 1.
205. See, e.g., NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, §§ 12, 16 (regulating forms of "pay"
student-athletes may receive).
206. See id. § 5.3.
207. See id. § 12.01.2.
208. See id. §1.3.1.
209. Cf. supra text accompanying note 88 (describing how a student-athlete upholds the
integrity of the game).
210. Compare NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 2.9 ("Student-athletes shall be amateurs
in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived."), with id. § 12.01.2 ('The student-athlete
is considered an integral part of the student body, thus maintaining a clear line of demarcation
between college athletics and professional sports.").
211. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
212. See NCAA's Black Market, supra note 146 (quoting former NBA star Charles Barkley,
"How in the world can they call it amateur if the pay $11 million to broadcast the NCAA
Tournament?").
213. See, e.g., Fuhrmeister, supra note 189.
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B. Close the Gap: Create a Stipend as a Supplement to Athletic
Scholarships
The NCAA posits that compensating student-athletes for their
performance in sporting events is superfluous because student-athletes
receive the benefits of a college education in exchange for their
participation. 2 4 But the $40 million settlement in O'Bannon forces the
NCAA and member schools to confront the reality that they may not be
able to dodge distributing some of the revenue generated from
commercializing collegiate sports to student-athletes. 215 In light of this
reality check, the NCAA should balance any potential equitable
solutions for reallocating revenue to student-athletes with its mission
to promote the ideal of the student-athlete. 216
In theory, the plaintiffs' proposition in O'Bannon for the
establishment of a trust conditional upon graduation enables the NCAA
to maintain its stance that collegiate athletes should not be paid for
their performance while participating in intercollegiate competition. 217
Pragmatically, however, the implementation of a trust and the
condition that student-athletes must graduate in order to access the
trust provides only future financial security-and then only for the
student-athletes who actually graduate. 218  And what about
student-athletes who leave school early, forgoing graduation, because
of financial pressure to pursue more lucrative professional careers? 21 9
214. See, e.g., Staples, Big Ten Could De-Emphasize Athletics, supra note 103.
215. See, e.g., Fuhrmeister, supra note 189.
216. See NCAA's Black Market, supra note 146 (quoting NCAA president that "to protect
student-athlete success, there must be substantive change to the enterprise").
217. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 16; supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
218. See Notice of Motion and Motion by Antitrust Plaintiffs for Class Certification and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, in re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litigation, 2012 WL 4043912 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012) (No. 4:09-cv-1967 CW
(NC)).
219. This touches upon a third obstacle: Which athletes should benefit? Cf. In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327, at
*8-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013) (explaining manageability issues stemming from uncertainties with
respect to which former student-athletes would have benefited from group licensing). For example,
if the majority of the revenue comes from the licensing of a basketball player's image and likeness,
should that revenue only be directed toward trust funds for that specific basketball player, all
basketball players at that institution, or all student-athletes regardless of their sport? Judge
Wilken addressed a related concern in her partial denial of class certification in O'Bannon. Id.; see
Steve Berkowitz, Judge Allows Challenge of Amateurism Rules, USA TODAY SPORTS (Nov. 8, 2013,
12:30 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/11/08/ncaa-class-action-lawsuit-
obannon-amateurism/3479501. Judge Wilken ruled that the plaintiffs can challenge the NCAA's
restrictions on player benefits, but denied class certification for the entitlement of damages from
the NCAA's improper use of licensing player images and likenesses. In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 8, 2013) Judge Wilken's decision prompted discussion about the possibility of creating trade
associations responsible for entering into licensing deals for student-athletes, provided that any
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Generally, the student-athletes leaving to pursue professional careers
are the marquee players who generate the lion's share of revenue for
their respective sports-the revenue that the NCAA would be required
to allocate to the trusts.220 Thus, establishing a trust neither provides
an immediate remedy for the shortfall in scholarships nor improves a
student-athlete's ability to cover her necessary living expenses.
221
Instead, the NCAA should create a stipend to supplement the
athletic scholarships to remedy the immediate problem of a gap
between scholarships and living expenses, thereby reducing the
financial vulnerability of student-athletes while participating in college
athletics. Unlike the trust, a stipend would benefit any student-athlete
while she competes at the collegiate level, thus eliminating the
distinction between student-athletes who graduate and those who leave
early.222 In another respect, the stipend would offset student-athletes'
inability to balance school and practice with work.223 The expectations
of student-athletes are significant-they must enroll in at least twelve
credit hours a semester, perform well in the classroom, practice twenty
hours per week, and attend weekly compliance and academic
meetings. 224 Once a student-athlete commits time to studying, eating,
and sleeping, so little time remains that one cannot expect a
student-athlete to hold down a job.
225
The NCAA owes a duty to student-athletes to protect their
well-being and promote the importance of education. 226 Creating a
stipend would help the NCAA fulfill that duty because it would
minimize the distractions student-athletes face relating to their
financial burdens. 227  With the financial burden relieved, a
student-athlete could compete fairly-on the field and in the
classroom-with less temptation to engage in sports wagering and less
profits from such deals would be dispersed equally among all players. See McCann, supra note
106. While exploring the inequities of this obstacle is beyond the scope of this Note, the discussion
of trade associations for licensing deals suggests the ruling in O'Bannon will dramatically affect
the landscape of college athletics and demand a fundamental change to the NCAA's concept of
amateurism.
220. See, e.g., BACON, supra note 85, at 350 ("Only a few, like Denard Robinson[, former
quarterback for the University of Michigan,] make more money for their school than their school
spends on them.").
221. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
222. Cf. supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (discussing certain disadvantages of
establishing a trust).
223. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., BACON, supra note 85, at 347-60 (following the day in the life of a Division
I quarterback).
226. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, § 1.3.1.
227. Student-athletes could focus on studying and competing, rather than worrying about
how they will cover their expenses. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 170.
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vulnerability to bad actors beyond the NCAA's reach. 228 By limiting
the external burdens on student-athletes, a stipend puts
student-athletes in a better position to exemplify the modern ideal at
the heart of NCAA athletics: students first, athletes second. 229
One factor weighing against a stipend is the uncertainty of the
source of the money to fund the stipend. Schools with larger athletic
programs may be able to afford an increase in the scholarship amounts;
however, this would put schools with smaller, less flexible budgets at a
disadvantage. 230 This is where the legalization of sports wagering
could actually benefit the NCAA. 231  If-or when-states begin to
legalize sports-wagering schemes, the NCAA should use its influence
over state legislatures to invest a portion of the revenue in funds
supporting intercollegiate competition.23 2 This would increase the
amount of money available to each member institution within the state
operating a legal sports-wagering scheme, which could then fund the
stipends.2 33 Similarly, the public may react positively if it understands
that the distribution of sports-gambling revenue prioritizes higher
education and intercollegiate athletic purposes. 23 4 The NCAA would
preserve the fans' respect, and thus the integrity of the game.
C. Increase Oversight Function by Creating Partnerships
Although relaxing its standard governing amateurism and
creating a stipend would reduce the risk that student-athletes will
resort to sports-wagering activities to cover the costs of attending
college, it would not eliminate the risk entirely.235 It may reduce the
risk to those that "succumb to financial pressures," but there are some
student-athletes who either "break NCAA rules without knowing it" or
228. Cf. Rychlak, supra note 46, at 323 (providing reasons behind student-athletes'
participation in sports wagering).
229. See supra text accompanying note 208.
230. See Kahn, supra note 170.
231. But see supra Part I.D. 1 (discussing the risk of sports wagering to the integrity of the
game).
232. The impact of the NCAA's influence over state legislatures assumes the NCAA will
experience the same success as when it employed the mechanism of withholding NCAA
championships from Oregon and New Jersey. See supra notes 132, 141-42 and accompanying text.
233. For example, if New Jersey expects to generate an additional $225 million a year in
revenue, then a portion of that amount would significantly benefit the member institutions in New
Jersey. See Mondics, supra note 64.
234. See, e.g., Steve Brandon, Sports Action Game Off Slowly as State Takes First Football
Bets, OREGONIAN (Sept. 7, 1989), http://archive.is/TOMpS ("[An Oregon constituent] said he liked
knowing that 34 percent of the Sports Action wagering [went] for athletics and scholarships at
Oregon colleges and universities' while Oregon operated the Sports Action gambling scheme.).
235. See Farrey, supra note 169 (suggesting student-athletes may face substantial credit
card debts after graduating).
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simply do not believe sports wagering is a big deal. 236 Thus, the NCAA
should prepare to address the subsistence of sports wagering and the
risks it imposes on student-athletes by forming partnerships with other
administrative institutions.237
To address its lack of binding authority over non-members, the
NCAA can increase oversight of sports wagering by further developing
its relationship with gaming commissions and the FBI. 238 Gaming
commissions, the FBI, and the NCAA share a desire for two things:
clean sporting events and an end to illegal gambling.239 By engaging
gaming commissions and the FBI, the NCAA should take advantage of
their resources and become aware of any irregularities in wagering
schemes. 240 It is a mutually beneficial relationship-the NCAA offers
additional oversight for the FBI in exchange for use of resources not
otherwise available to it.241 While the NCAA has taken a step in the
right direction by reaching out to the Nevada Betting Commission, it
should be prepared to reach out to any state if there is a change in the
sports-wagering status quo.
242
But, in order for the NCAA to uphold its end of the exchange, it
must first strike a balance between securing the financial stability of
its student-athletes and maintaining its current definition of
amateurism. That determination requires the NCAA to conduct an
internal audit of its antiquated rules and regulations to see which rules
best fit modern times.
243
236. See NCAA's Black Market, supra note 146.
237. E.g. College Sports Betting, supra note 115.
238. Although the NCAA currently partners with the FBI to conduct educational
presentations during the men's and women's NCAA national championship basketball
tournament, it would be beneficial to extend their partnership beyond this context in order to take
advantage of the FBI's resources. See id.
239. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (1983) (providing an example of the
FBI's efforts to stop sports bribery); Gambling on College Sports, supra note 90 ("[Tjhe NCAA and
Las Vegas sports wagering officials work closely together to identify instances in which the
integrity of college sports may threatened").
240. See Gambling on College Sports, supra note 90.
241. See id. The commissions want to maintain the legitimacy of their sports wagering
schemes because the exposure of scandals could damage the legal gambling industry and the
NCAA wants to utilize the commissions' expansive resources that are otherwise unavailable to the
NCAA. See Latest News, supra note 97; NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-6.
242. See Latest News, supra note 97; NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-6.
243. Recently, the NCAA began the process of internal reform by revamping its
enforcement structure, creating a four-tier hierarchy, designed to assist investigations of
infractions, enhance coach accountability, and emphasize a culture of "shared responsibility for
upholding the values of intercollegiate athletics." Gary Brown, Board Adopts Tougher, More
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although New Jersey's challenge to PASPA failed on its merits,
it succeeded in generating criticism of PASPA's validity and modern
applicability. So long as PASPA remains the law, states will continue
to explore ways to gain access into the exclusive, lucrative
sports-wagering market. Moreover, the persistence of illegal wagering
suggests that the NCAA should adopt a proactive strategy that focuses
on how to persevere in an emerging culture of sports wagering.
Recognizing the connection between its enforcement of rigid rules and
regulations and the vulnerability of student-athletes, the NCAA should
conduct an internal reform to lessen student-athlete exposure to any
threats related to sports wagering. The NCAA should utilize its
quasi-legislative authority to redefine amateurism to focus on the ideal
of the student-athlete, eliminating any distinction based on
compensation, and establish a stipend to reduce the shortfall in
scholarship coverage. By doing so, the NCAA can equip itself to tackle
the issue of an emerging culture of sports wagering head on.
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